{"id":12547,"date":"2019-02-28T12:38:45","date_gmt":"2019-02-28T12:38:45","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/test.epi.org.mk\/macedonias-internationalised-constitutional-amendment-process\/"},"modified":"2024-10-14T02:42:15","modified_gmt":"2024-10-14T00:42:15","slug":"macedonias-internationalised-constitutional-amendment-process","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/epi.org.mk\/en\/post\/12547","title":{"rendered":"Macedonia\u2019s internationalised constitutional amendment process"},"content":{"rendered":"

Authors: Simonida Kacarska<\/a> and Naum Lokoski<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

Introduction<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

In early February 2019, the Republic of Macedonia, until then provisionally recognised in the UN asthe\u00a0former\u00a0Yugoslav Republic of\u00a0Macedonia<\/em>, adopted\u00a0<\/span>constitutional changes<\/a><\/span>\u00a0through which it renamed itself\u00a0North<\/em>\u00a0Macedonia in line with the\u00a0<\/span>Prespa Agreement between the governments of Macedonia and Greece<\/a>\u00a0in June 2018<\/span>. The Prime Minister of Macedonia in a speech soon after the signing explained that the Agreement opens Macedonia\u2019s road to accession to the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). The\u00a0<\/span>agreement<\/a><\/span>\u00a0puts an end to a nearly three decades long dispute between the two neighbouring countries The dispute was marred with difficulties in international recognition, a trade embargo as well as a Greece veto on membership in international organisations. In addition to building new dynamics between the two countries, the tangible outcome of the constitutional changes and the agreement was the immediate signing of North Macedonia\u2019s NATO accession protocol. In practice, the name dispute was the primary reason for not allowing Macedonia to accede to the alliance since 2008 when it was first considered to have fulfilled the membership requirements.<\/span><\/p>\n

Background to the dispute and the Prespa Agreement<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

The declaration of an independent Macedonian state in 1991 was not welcomed in Greece, as it claimed that the term \u2018Macedonia\u2019 is an essential element of its own culture, as well as implies territorial ambitions on its northern province of Macedonia. As a result, in the early 1990s Greece effectively blocked the efforts of Macedonia to gain international recognition, especially in the EU and imposed a costly trade embargo on its neighbour.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The name dispute was intrinsically linked with the international recognition of the Republic of Macedonia, and later became a stark obstacle to its membership in the EU and NATO. In the early 1990s, the establishment of Macedonia\u2019s relations with the European Community was strained due to objections of Greece to its constitutional name. At the Lisbon summit in June 1992, due to Greek pressure, the EU decided to withhold recognition of the newly independent state, contrary to the advisory opinion of the Badinter Commission, specifically established for this purpose. The European Council\u00a0<\/span>conclusions<\/a><\/span>\u00a0expressed \u2018readiness to recognise that republic within its existing borders according to their Declaration on 16 December 1991 under a name which does not include the term Macedonia\u2019. A consensual (albeit temporary) solution was found with the country joining the UN in 1993 under a provisional name \u2018the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia\u2019. Formal diplomatic relations between Macedonia and the EU were not established until December 1995, after the signing of the\u00a0<\/span>Interim Accord<\/a><\/span>\u00a0between the two countries in September of the same year. In the Accord, Greece undertook not to veto Macedonia\u2019s entry into regional and international organisations under the provisional reference, thus creating conditions for establishing full diplomatic relations with the EU, which evolved in to the country\u2019s acquisition of a status of a candidate for membership in the Union in 2005.<\/span><\/p>\n

Greece formally blocked Macedonia’s membership to NATO in 2008.\u00a0<\/span><\/em><\/strong><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Yet, in April 2008, at the NATO summit in Bucharest, the members of the alliance failed to reach consensus on Macedonia\u2019s membership, although the country was considered to fulfil membership requirements. This was the first time Greece exercised a veto over Macedonia\u2019s membership in an international organisation under the provisional reference, which effectively led to the\u00a0Judgment of the International Court of Justice<\/a>\u00a0in favour of Macedonia, proclaiming that Greece has breached the 1995 Interim Accord. The judgment had no practical implications on solving the name dispute. A year later, the dispute also transferred to the EU arena. In 2009, the European Commission recommended the start of accession negotiations which Macedonia was awaiting since 2005 when it obtained a candidate status for EU membership. Yet, the\u00a0<\/span>2009 European Commission report<\/a><\/span>\u00a0also noted that \u2018maintaining good neighbourly relations, including a negotiated and mutually acceptable solution to the name issue, under the auspices of the UN, remains essential\u2019. The recommendation for the negotiations was repeated until 2015 when it was suspended due to internal democratic backsliding of the country, only to be re-confirmed in April 2018 when a solution of the name dispute was in sight, which was signed only two months later. The resolution of the name dispute\u00a0<\/span>was at the core of the priorities of\u00a0the new government in Macedonia<\/a>, led by Prime Minister Zoran Zaev<\/span>, that took power in mid-2017 to unblock the country\u2019s accession path. For this purpose, the signing of the Prespa Agreement was timed several days ahead of the meeting of the European Council at which Macedonia\u2019s EU accession negotiations were again placed on the agenda of EU leaders.<\/span><\/p>\n

The aftermath of the signing of the Prespa Agreement<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

The path that followed the signing of the agreement since June 2018 in both countries was anything but smooth. On the Macedonian side, after the signing, the National Assembly ratified the Prespa Agreement in June 2018 with a simple majority that was needed for this purpose. President Gjorge Ivanov, in an attempt to stop the name-change and the implementation of the agreement, did not sign the ratification, as he considered the agreement a\u00a0<\/span>\u2018criminal act\u2019 that violated the Constitution.<\/a><\/span>\u00a0Although constitutionally obliged, the President refused to sign the ratification even after Parliament voted for the second time on the Agreement.<\/span><\/p>\n

The agreement stipulates that, if it chooses, Macedonia can hold a referendum on the name issue. Prime Minister Zaev\u00a0<\/span>announced<\/a><\/span>\u00a0that this would be the case, albeit the referendum was deemed to be consultative. The Parliament set 30 September 2018 as a date for the consultative referendum on the Prespa Agreement and constitutional reforms to change the name of the country. The question to which the citizens were asked was \u2018Are you in favour of European Union and NATO membership by accepting the agreement between the Republic of Macedonia and the Republic of Greece?<\/em>\u2019. While the clarity of the question was highly\u00a0<\/span>contested<\/a><\/span>, the intention of the government was to make sure that the name change is understood by the public as a precondition towards EU and NATO membership, both of which enjoy overwhelming public support. In these circumstances, the framing of the opposition to the agreement also implied that one would be against the country\u2019s EU and NATO membership. As a result, most of the opponents to the agreement opted for a boycott of the referendum. The biggest opposition party in Parliament decided not to instruct its supporters as to a decision, although prominent party leaders campaigned in support of a boycott and its leadership has strongly criticised the agreement. On the day of the referendum,\u00a0<\/span>37 per cent of the registered voters<\/a><\/span>\u00a0turned out to the polls<\/span>, out of which more than 94 per cent supported the Prespa Agreement. The referendum did not reach the legal turnout threshold of 50 per cent of the registered voters and was thus declared unsuccessful.\u00a0\u00a0<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

The constitutional referendum was unsuccessful as it did not reach the legal turnout threshold of 50 per cent of the registered voters.\u00a0\u00a0<\/strong><\/span><\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Following the referendum, on 8 October 2018, the Macedonian government adopted the proposal for changing the Constitution, as provided by the Prespa Agreement and sent the proposal to the Parliament. In order to start discussion on constitutional changes, 80 of the 120 members of parliament must support the proposal. Yet, the ruling coalition by then had\u00a0<\/span>secured 71 votes. Political wrangling to obtain the additional votes necessary for passing the constitutional changes followed. In order to get part of the opposition on board Prime Minister Zaev in his speech in front of the Parliament before the voting\u00a0called for<\/a>\u00a0reconciliation<\/em>\u00a0which was interpreted as a form of amnesty for opposition MPs accused in a pending court case. The court case is linked to the events of\u00a027 April 2017, when\u00a0an informal protest movement \u2018For a Joint Macedonia\u2019 (supported by the main opposition party) violently entered the Assembly and physically attacked four members of parliament\u00a0<\/span>and injured more than 100 people.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span>Five opposition MPs who were accused in a pending court case<\/a>\u00a0\u00a0were released from detention on the day of the vote and several of them voted in favor of the start of the discussion on constitutional changes. The reconciliation has largely been perceived as saving the perpetrators from\u00a0jail time<\/a>. This offer and the negotiations with the other members of Parliament resulted with\u00a080 votes \u2018for\u2019 the amendment and Parliament accepted constitutional amendments to change the country\u2019s name. The final vote endorsing the proposed amendments, drafted together by the government and other members of parliament that supported the name-change, happened on 11 January 2019, when\u00a0<\/span>the Parliament with 81 votes\u00a0(one more than the required two-third majority)<\/a>adopted the changes to the Constitution<\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n

What is in the constitutional changes?<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

In mid-January 2019, Parliament adopted four amendments to the Constitution which included foremost an<\/span>amendment which changes the name of the country from \u2018Republic of Macedonia\u2019 to \u2018Republic of\u00a0North<\/em><\/strong>Macedonia\u2019. The second amendment further specified that \u2018the Republic will respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of neighboring states\u2019, in line with the requirements of neighboring Greece. Thirdly, Parliament also voted for an amendment that specifies that the country will protect, guarantee and cherish the characteristics, historical and cultural heritage of the Macedonian people and the rights and interests of its citizens, including different ethnic groups, that live abroad. The same amendment also stipulates that the country won\u2019t intervene in the sovereign rights of other states and in their internal affairs. The latter two amendments are linked specifically to the objections of Greece regarding the lack of recognition and difficult historical circumstances of the treatment of the Macedonian\u00a0minority<\/a>\u00a0in Greece.<\/p>\n

The amendment also includes the recognition of the collective rights of the Albanian ethnic community in Macedonia.\u00a0<\/strong><\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

The fourth<\/span>\u00a0amendment changed the Preamble of the Constitution, which now specifies the historic documents to which the constitution refers and also recognizes the Ohrid Framework Agreement (the agreement from 2001 granting large collective rights to the Albanian ethnic community) as a constitutive document of the country, together with Krusevo Republic and 8 September (Independence Day).<\/p>\n

These amendments were to become effective only after the ratification of the Prespa Agreement by Greece and the ratification of the Protocol for accession of North Macedonia to NATO by the Greek Parliament. In effect, if the Greek Parliament would not support these two documents, the constitutional changes in Macedonia would be void, therefore internationalizing the constitutional amendment process.<\/p>\n

The uneasy process in Greece<\/strong><\/p>\n

Following the adoption of the constitutional changes in Macedonia, the process moved on to Greece, where the Prespa Agreement stirred\u00a0a polarizing debate<\/a>\u00a0and a\u00a0government reshuffle<\/a>\u00a0amidst violent public protests.\u00a0\u00a0Before the actual vote on the agreement, the Greek government led by prime minister Alexis Tsipras\u00a0survived a confidence vote<\/a>, as Panos Kammenos\u2019s ANEL party, left the governing coalition, precisely because of the Prespa Agreement. Nevertheless, several members of parliament from ANEL expressed confidence in Tsipras\u2019s government and voted for the ratification of the deal with Macedonia. Greece experienced violent protests against the agreement. Following this turmoil, on 25 January 2019,\u00a0the Greek parliament ratified the Prespa Agreement<\/a>. On 8 February 2019, Greece ratified the Protocol for North Macedonia\u2019s NATO membership as the last condition for the constitutional changes in Macedonia to become effective and the country to change its name to North Macedonia.<\/p>\n

Political dynamics at the domestic level may create some hurdles.\u00a0<\/strong><\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Kyriakos Mitsotakis, the leader of the main opposition party in Greece who\u00a0could take over<\/a>\u00a0the leadership of the Greek government after next elections in autumn 2019,\u00a0reluctantly<\/a>\u00a0conceded that although his political party, New Democracy, can\u2019t reverse the Prespa Agreement, he would use his leverage during the EU accession negotiations. The opposition are\u00a0seeking<\/a>\u00a0to capitalize on nationalist sentiments and have accused the ruling party of betrayal. Hurdles in this respect should in any case be expected. According to the Prespa Agreement, North Macedonia and Greece have an obligation to negotiate for trademarks, with direct implications on negotiations on the chapter dealing with intellectual property rights. In addition, chapters for education and culture in the EU accession negotiations could be a playground for new disagreements, because of specific issues about history and textbooks that need to be addressed between the two countries.<\/p>\n

Deserved praise and upcoming risks<\/strong><\/p>\n

The resolution of the Greek-Macedonian dispute has been hailed as an example of incredible political will and readiness to tackle seemingly intractable disputes in a region that has been known to produce conflicts instead of solutions. The US administration recently\u00a0called the Agreement the biggest achievement in the Balkans since the Dayton agreement<\/a>. The prime ministers of the two countries have also been\u00a0nominated<\/a>\u00a0for the Nobel Peace Prize and were recently\u00a0awarded the\u00a0Ewald von Kleist Award\u00a0<\/span>at the Munich Security Conference<\/a>\u00a0for exceptional contribution to peace building. The role of the two ministers of foreign affairs was also essential. Still, the practical implementation of the Agreement will depend on the behavior and actions of governments in North Macedonia and Greece. As politicians in the past have often found the name dispute to be a fertile ground for polarization and electoral gains, the success of the rapprochement depends on building and sustaining broad internal political buy-in to the Agreement on both sides of the border.<\/p>\n

On the Macedonian side, the renamed country\u2019s Euro-Atlantic integration remains a necessary condition for the acceptance of the Prespa Agreement, emphasizing the role of the international organizations, most notably EU and NATO.\u00a0\u00a0While for North Macedonia NATO membership will be a visible early benefit of the Agreement, the path to EU membership is expected to be much more complex. In this respect, the EU member states should recognise the precedent and immediately start the accession negotiations with North Macedonia. Equally importantly, once commenced, EU institutions should avoid the trap of the Macedonian negotiations becoming a hostage of demands linked to the Prespa agreement, beyond the standard EU accession requirements.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

This blog was originally published on CONSTITUTIONNET<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n

Photo: Macedonian PM Zoran Zaev and Greek PM Alexis Tsipiras before Sign the Prespa Agreement (photo credit: Nikos Arvanitidis\/EPA\/New York Times)<\/em><\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Authors: Simonida Kacarska and Naum Lokoski Introduction In early February 2019, the Republic of Macedonia, until then provisionally recognised in the UN asthe\u00a0former\u00a0Yugoslav Republic of\u00a0Macedonia, adopted\u00a0constitutional changes\u00a0through which it renamed itself\u00a0North\u00a0Macedonia in line with the\u00a0Prespa Agreement between the governments of Macedonia and Greece\u00a0in June 2018. The Prime Minister of Macedonia in a speech soon after […]<\/p>","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":12544,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[193],"tags":[334],"class_list":["post-12547","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-193","tag-2019-2"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\nMacedonia\u2019s internationalised constitutional amendment process - EPI<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/epi.org.mk\/en\/post\/12547\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"mk_MK\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Macedonia\u2019s internationalised constitutional amendment process - EPI\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Authors: Simonida Kacarska and Naum Lokoski Introduction In early February 2019, the Republic of Macedonia, until then provisionally recognised in the UN asthe\u00a0former\u00a0Yugoslav Republic of\u00a0Macedonia, adopted\u00a0constitutional changes\u00a0through which it renamed itself\u00a0North\u00a0Macedonia in line with the\u00a0Prespa Agreement between the governments of Macedonia and Greece\u00a0in June 2018. 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